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Abstract 
 
This paper proposes three different chaotic encryption methods using 1-D chaotic map known as Logistic 
map named as Logistic, NLFSR and Modified NLFSR according to the name of chaotic map and non-linear 
function involved in the scheme. The designed schemes have been crypt analyzed for five different methods 
for testing its strength. Cryptanalysis has been performed for various texts using various keys selected from 
domain of key space. Logistic and NLFSR methods are found to resist known plaintext attack for available 
first two characters of plaintext. Plaintext sensitivity of both methods is within small range along with me-
dium key sensitivity. Identifiability for keys of first two of the scheme has not been derived concluding that 
methods may prove to be weak against brute-force attack. In the last modified scheme avalanche effect found 
to be improved compared to the previous ones and method is found to resist brute-force attack as it derives 
the conclusion for identifiability. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Chaotic cryptography [1] deals with hiding and recover-
ing of secret messages using algorithm which consists of 
encryption rule that uses chaotic functions (analog or di- 
gital). Logistic map is one-dimensional map that consists 
of a parameter which is acting as secret key in the de-
signed encryption schemes. The proposed methods use 
non-linear functions like, sinusoidal, non-linear shift re- 
gister and logistic map to built confusion and diffusion.  
The sine function describes a smooth repetitive oscil-
lation. It’s most basic form as a function of time (t) is: 
   siny t A wt    
where, A, the amplitude is the peak deviation of the func-
tion from its center position. ω, the angular frequency, 
specifies how many oscillations occur in a unit time in-
terval, in radians per second. φ, the phase, specifies 
where in its cycle the oscillation begins at t = 0. 
A NLFSR (Non-Linear Feedback Shift-register) is a 
common component in modern stream ciphers, especially 
in RFID and smartcard applications. NLFSRs are known 
to be more resistant to cryptanalytic attacks than Linear 
Feedback Shift Registers (LFSR’s), although construction 
of large NLFSRs with guaranteed long periods remains 
an open problem. A NLFSR, is a shift register whose 
current state is a non-linear function of its previous state. 
The NLFSR used here is shown in Figure 1 output. 
The logistic map is a polynomial mapping of degree 2, 
it takes a point, in a plane and maps it to a new point 
using following expressions: 
      1 1x k r x k x k   ; 
where, map depends on the parameter r. From r = 3.57 to 
r = 4, the map exhibits chaotic behavior which is shown 
in Figure 2. 
Cryptanalysis is the study of attacks against crypto-
graphic schemes to disclose its possible weakness. Dur-
ing cryptanalyzing a ciphering algorithm, the general 
assumption made is that the cryptanalyst knows exactly 
the design and working of the cryptosystem under study, 
i.e., he/she knows everything about the cryptosystem ex- 
cept the secret key. It is possible to differentiate between 
different levels of attacks on cryptosystems. They are 
briefly explained as follows: 
a) Cipher text-only attack: The attacker possesses a 
string of cipher text. 
b) Known plain text: The attacker possesses a string of 
plain text, p, and the corresponding cipher text, c. 
c) Chosen plain text: The attacker has obtained tempo- 
rary access to the encryption machinery. Hence he/she can 
choose a plain text string, p, and construct the corre  
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Figure 1. NLFSR using 8-bit shift registers. 
 
 
Figure 2. Plot of Logistic map for r = 3.99, x(0) = 0.99, n = 5000. 
 
sponding cipher text string, c. 
d) Chosen cipher text: The attacker has obtained tem-
porary access to the decryption machinery. Hence he/ she 
can choose a cipher text string, c, and construct the corre-
sponding plain text string, p. 
e) Brute Force Attack: A brute force attack is the me- 
thod of breaking a cipher by trying every possible key. 
The brute force attack is the most expensive one, owing 
to the exhaustive search. 
In addition to the five general attacks described above, 
there are some other specialized attacks, like, differential 
and linear attacks. 
Differential cryptanalysis is a kind of chosen-plaintext 
attack aimed at finding the secret key in a cipher. It ana-
lyzes the effect of particular differences in chosen plain-
text pairs on the differences of the resultant cipher text 
pairs. These differences can be used to assign probabili-
ties to the possible keys and to locate the most probable 
key. 
Linear cryptanalysis is a type of known-plaintext at-
tack, whose purpose is to construct a linear approximate 
expression of the cipher under study. It is a method of 
finding a linear approximation expression or linear path 
between plaintext and cipher text bits and then extends it 
to the entire algorithm and finally reaches a linear appro- 
ximate expression without intermediate value. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
The complete methodology involved during designing is 
clearly cited with the help of block diagram as shown in 
Figure 3.  
The plain text is encrypted by an encryption rule which 
uses non-linear function and the state generated by the 
chaotic system in the transmitter [2]. The scrambled 
output is inputted further to the chaotic system such that 
the chaotic dynamics is changed continuously in a very 
complex way. Then another state variable of the chaotic 
system [3] in the transmitter is transmitted through the 
channel. 
Recovery of the plaintext is done by decrypting the 
input (ciphertext) using reverse process of encryption, as 
used in the transmitter. 
In the modified NLFSR method traditional encryption 
method is used along with above method. For Logistic- 
sinusoidal function and logistic map and for NLFSR- 
Non-linear shift register and logistic map has been used 
respectively. 
 
3. Analysis and Results 
 
The analysis accomplished on the designed ciphers has 
been done for key space [4], avalance effect, known- 
plaintext attack, Identifiability [5] [6] and results are 
cited in tabular form. 
a) Logistic: Key Space range is from 3.57 to 4.0; 
b) NLFSR: Key Space range is from 3.57 to 4.0; 
c) Modified NLFSR: Key space is from 3.57 to 4.0. 
 
4. Conclusions and Future Scope 
 
Tables 1 and 2 show that Logistic and NLFSR methods 
are found to resist known plaintext attack for available 
first two characters of plaintext but modified NLFSR 
proves its resistance against the attack for available some 
numbers of characters of plaintext as given in the column 
of Table 3. It also proves its resistance against brute- 
force attack by deriving conclusion for identifiability of 
selected key. All the three methods are similar to one- 
time pad type instead more secure. 
More secure ciphers can be designed and crypt ana-
lyzed [7,8] using different non-linear functions and 2-D 
 
 
Figure 3. Methodology used in design of chaotic cryptosys-
tem. (a): Transmitter end (encryptor); (b): Receiver end 
(decryptor). (p: plaintext; c: ciphertext; x: state of chaotic 
function; y: Intermediate encrypted plaintext). 
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Table 1. Analysis Table for Logistic method. 
Sl. no. Plaintext Key value Ciphertext 
Plaintext
sensitivity
(in %)
Key 
sensitivity
(in %) 
Domain for key
with increment = 
0.0001 
Identifiability 
of key for 
iteration value 
= 1 or 2 
Robustness against 
known plaintext 
attack 
for p=[p1 p2] 
Whether key can act 
as secret key against 
Brute Force attack?
1. Hello! how are you? 3.65 
BHZOR0Nhw`X
Vb?WoM 3.9474 46.7105 (3.57, 3.78) NI R NO 
2. 
Ram scored 
98 marks in 
Maths. 
3.71 jPw+4(f}mmWekf8bq9m C|*i: 2.0833 43.7500 (3.67, 3.87) NI R NO 
3. Thank you,sir. 3.87 >3ieVyl1[w5f\ 4.1667 50 (3.77, 3.97) NI R NO 
4. 
The match 
was very 
exciting. 
3.88  J?/el?jZl67 H3;LLE~2Je-yeOzY 4.7414 46.1207 (3.78, 3.98) NI R NO 
5. 
I will be 
leaving at 9 
p.m. 
3.89 ZDWuQ/9H<r4c*\{>l}s?D4UgX 1.8519 42.5926 (3.79, 3.99) NI R NO 
NI – Non-Identifiable ; I – Identifiable ; R – Robust; p [p1 p2…pn] – First ‘n’ characters of available plaintext string. 
 
Table 2. Analysis table for NLFSR method. 
Sl.no. Plaintext Key value Ciphertext 
Plaintext 
sensitivity
(in %) 
Key 
sensitivity
(in %) 
Domain for key
With increment = 
0.0001 
Identifiability 
of key for 
iteration value 
=1 or 2 
Robustness against 
known plaintext 
attack for p = [p1 
p2] 
Whether key can act 
as secret key against 
Brute Force attack?
1. I am going to market. 3.7328 ¸èøxè0ø¸OØ¨0v 0.5682 20.4545 (3.57,3.77) NI R NO 
2. Hello!how are you? 3.7694 ¨78÷øðP¨ø°ý 0.6579 25 (3.57,3.77) NI R NO 
3. 
Ram scored 
98 marks in 
Maths. 
3.8551 K¸ÐÈ÷P¨'¸PØÏw´0Ïv 0.4167 18.3333 (3.76,3.96) NI R NO 
4. Thank you,sir. 3.8641 ,w× ø¯6ÐPu 0.8333 30.8333 (3.78,3.98) NI R NO 
5. 
The match 
was very 
exciting. 
3.9065 +§·0ÇïÏo§P§-È/wèu 0.4310 28.0172 (3.785,3.985) NI R NO 
 
Table 3. Analysis table for modified NLFSR method. 
Sl. no. Plaintext Key value Ciphertext 
Plaintext 
sensitivity
(in %) 
Key 
sensitivity
(in %) 
Domain for key
With increment = 
0.0001 
Identifiability 
of key for 
iteration value 
= 1 or 2 
Robustness against 
known plaintext 
attack. 
Whether key can act 
as secret key against 
Brute Force attack?
1. What is your name? 3.6424 
-§Án_ªÏ¾X<Ó¬
sÊmÄ 9.2105 16.4474 (3.57,3.77) I 
R for p=[p1 
p2 …p5] 
YES 
2. I am going to market. 3.7328 
|| vfª(ò`(¬ô6ýR2
& 10.7955 17.0455 (3.57,3.77) I 
R for p=[p1 
p2…p19] 
YES 
3. 
Sita is sing-
ing very 
well. 
3.8544 BÛ¼~eÂ=ßRf1àdØùFî;d*p 6.4815 12.9630 (3.66,3.86) I 
R for p=[p1 
p2 …p19] 
YES 
4. 
Ram scored 
98 marks in 
Maths. 
3.8551 
Lª ½jdSÜ* ¢æ
%<Äc&;$ÍèÅ<-
±& 
5.8333 14.5833 (3.76,3.96) I R for p=[p1 p2 …p19] 
YES 
5. Jaycee pub-lication. 3.8529 
=txý®&Ó`Fà-
â$# 14.3750 23.1250 (3.77,3.97) I 
R for p=[p1 p2 … 
p15] 
YES 
M. MISHRA  ET  AL. 
 
Copyright © 2011 SciRes.                                                                                IJCNS 
455
 
chaotic maps [9] using different encryption rule. Im-
provement in the property of avalanche effect of designed 
ciphers is required in future. 
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